to explain some of the end of my previous post: the last set of justifications would be what we might call "ethical": a state which is not based on consent is justfied by its accomplishment of justice, perhaps understood as a defense of rights of its citizens. rawls should be read this way: his contract and consent are wholly hypothetical, the question being what principles of justice people would agree to under certain counterfactual circumstances. a crystal-clear example, of course, would be plato, who justfies some kind of crazy dictatorship of philosophers - maintained by deception and coercion - wholly by appeal to a conception of justice (=each person doing that for which she is best-suited). then the question would be, first, would any result with respect to justice be enough to override the freedoms at stake of individuals, and second, could that result actually be produced practically, and the safeguards put into place against abuse of power? or not.