ok let me try to explain how i see the 'irrealist' mistake very briefly: it starts (to simplify) in descartes: we start with dreams and hallucinations, cases wherein we (seem to) have mental images or 'ideas' without any external reference. we're going to try to explain our experience of the external world by moving outward from internal experiences such as dreams. this literally requires a supernatural chain of events to make the move. we're inferring the existence of a world from our pictures. this is, putting it mildly, bassackwards. but it is the founding thought of modern philosophy. also it is non-explanatory: images require physical apparatus to be seen just like cows. the best you'd get is an infinite regress of humuncular eyes. for this and other reasons, the problem invented by descartes is insoluble, ends you in scepticism about the external world.
so the empiricists disagreed with descartes' epistemology, the rationalists elaborated it, but they all shared this disastrous picture of what it's like to be a human being. it's not like that at all. the empiricists called their images 'sense impressions.' hume showed the end in scepticism. berkeley just dematerialized the world on this basis. logical positivism, e.g., is just a close reading of hume.
kant 'solves' the sceptical conclusion by making the mistake much more thorough and pervasive. it's as though there's an external world because human consciousness cannot but shape a universe of space and time and causation; these are not our inventions, they are the very forms of human consciousness. but they are things we impose on an unknowable reality, not real themselves outside us. the picture is profoundly anti-naturalistic, and if we are the way we are because we've adapted to the world, as darwin taught, kant is wrong.
ok then you get hegel's absolute idealism, schopenhauer's version, etc. and as we move into the twentieth century, and moving from hegel, you start to see instead of sense impressions etc the social construction of reality through language. it's a very different position than empiricism, say, in a million ways, and it has important insights. but it still moves outward through consciousness to the world it...invents, constructs, discovers as a social artifact. hermeneutics and deconstruction and neo-pragmatism belong here. wittgenstein belongs here, maybe heidegger, maybe dewey.
now it's not that there aren't realist currents: indeed something so obviously true and fundamental even to our internal experiences or our use of language could not be killed. nietzsche has radically realist moments. marx does. even dewey and heidegger do, perhaps (though only moments). now it's time to say the world made us, and it is our bodies and it enters our bodies in perception, which is a form of ingestion. and now we are developing philosophical spokespersons for an actual world.
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