i'll give an example of a g.e. moore takedown, this one of william james's version of the pragmatist theory of truth, as expressed by james in "pragmatism's conception of truth."
It is almost certainly false that all our true ideas are useful, and almost certainly false that all our useful ideas are true. But I have only urged what seem to me to be the most obvious objections to these two statements: I have not tried to sustain these objections by elaborate argument, partly for a reason I now wish to state. The fact is, I am not at all sure that Professor James would not himself admit that both these statements are false. I think it is quite possible he would admit that they are, and would say that he never meant either to assert or imply the contrary. He complains that some of the critics of Pragmatism are unwilling to read any but the silliest of possible meanings into Pragmatism; and, perhaps he would say that this is the case here. I certainly hope that he would. I certainly hope he would say that these statements, to which I have objected, are silly. For it does seem to me intensely silly to say that we can verify all our true ideas; intensely silly to say that every one of our true beliefs is at some time useful; intensely silly to say that every idea which is ever useful is true. I hope Professor James would admit all these things to be silly, for if he and other Pragmatists would admit even as as much as this, I think a good deal would be gained. But it by no means follows that because a philosopher would admit a view to be silly, when it is definitely put before him, he has not himself been constantly holding and implying that very view. He may quite sincerely protest that he never has either held or implied it, and yet he may all the time have been not only implying it but holding it - vaguely, perhaps, but really. A man may assure us, quite sincerely, that he is not angry; he may really think that he is not, and yet we may be able to judge quite certainly from what he says that he really is angry. He may assure is quite sincerely that he never meant anything to our discredit by what he said - that he was not thinking of anything in the least discreditable to us, and yet it may be plain from his words that he was actually condemning us very severely. And so with a philosopher. He may protest, quite angrily, when a view is put before him in other words than his own, that he never either meant or implied any such thing, and yet it may be possible to judge, from what he says, that this very view, wrapped up in other words, was not only held by him but what was precisely what made his thoughts seem to him quite interesting and important.
this skewers not only james, but many a pragmatist of my acquaintance. the view is initially formulated in a sharp, seemingly pretty clear, way. press on it just a little, though, and it slips away into an endless chase through what 'working' or 'working in the long run,' really means. he adjusts his account to deal with every new counter-example, until he ends up counting more or less just what a correspondence theorist would count as true.
[passage is from moore's essay "william james' 'pragmatism,'" collected in philosophical studies.]
