Beauty on the Comeback Trail
By Crispin Sartwell
Like monarchs, angels, and comedians, concepts fall, and
rarely has a concept taken a more tragic or comical tumble than beauty. Once,
it inhabited the sphere of ultimate value, glittering in the empyrean along
with truth, goodness, and justice (all of which were considered by Plato or the
romantic poets to be the same thing). Long about 1910, it got kicked downstairs
to the department of hairstyling. From
eternal essence it got demoted to superficial appearance.
Beauty’s pratfall
was registered both in the arts and in philosophy. Picasso or De Kooning didn’t
paint to make beautiful things; they painted to transform the world. And
probably the last great treatments of the topic in philosophy – at least until
recently – were Santayana’s Sense of
Beauty (1895) and Benedetto Croce’s Aesthetic
(1902).
The reasons for the
indignities heaped on beauty are complex. One of them is that, beginning in the
eighteenth century (for example in Hume and Kant), beauty was conceived more
and more as a subjective matter, and as conceptually connected to pleasure. By
the time Santayana wrote his dissertation, he could argue that beauty was
actually a kind of mistake: the person who experiences beauty attributes his
own subjective pleasure to the object that causes it. If beauty is entirely
subjective or in the eye of the beholder, then not only is it not an eternal concept,
it is not a concept at all: ‘beauty’ means whatever anyone thinks it means, and
hence it means nothing.
In Romanticism
and Modernism, the artist – think Beethoven, Van Gogh, Giacometti – was
conceived as a genius, his works emerging inexplicably from his superhuman-but-ill
skull to re-make human experience. The idea that someone like that was working
to bring people pleasure would have seemed in the era an intolerable
trivialization of art; we could leave that task to the entertainment or cosmetics
industry. So beauty, conceived as a source or even a variety of pleasure, came
to seem an unworthy goal.
And it came to be
associated with what we would now call right-wing politics: with the
architecture and visual expressions of the Catholic Church, with the French
monarchy and its rococo kitsch, with capitalism and its robber-baron art
patrons, with the Third Reich (for example in Leni Riefenstahl’s undeniably beautiful
film Olympia). The left turned
against beauty as a whole, and in the realm of concepts beauty was pitted
against justice, luxurious ornament or conspicuous consumption against
subsistence for the poor and education for the masses.
Indeed, the
association of beauty and pleasure with fascism is one of the darkest episodes
in the history of human consciousness. Arthur Danto, in The Abuse of Beauty, one of several important recent philosophical
treatments of the topic, quotes Max Ernst, recalling the dadaists after World
War I: “We had experienced the collapse into ridicule and shame of everything
represented to us as just, true, and beautiful. My works of that period were
not meant to attract, but to make people scream.”
Yet even after the
fall, beauty has never ceased to be a fundamental human experience or even one
of the reasons life is worth living. And if the beauty of a rose or a sunset
seems exhausted or clichéd as a subject of art, poetry, or philosophy, we have never
ceased to experience such things as beautiful, perhaps with as much purity as
ever, with as much of a sense of a renewal of commitment to life and to the
world.
And though such a venerable dimension of human
experience and of the arts could never be entirely neglected, beauty seems to
be in revival both in art and in philosophy. The first steps in making beauty
viable would be to detach it conceptually from pleasure and to treat it as more
than merely subjective.
Indeed, to hold
that when I find a flower or a song beautiful, I am delectating my own internal
states, is a horrendous solipsistic distortion. If I say that the night sky is
beautiful, I want to celebrate it, not myself, and though I may be registering
pleasure (though also perhaps, many other things: awe, love, freedom, fear), I
am talking about the night sky, not me, or else the point of the thing is
completely lost. Indeed, the idea that I am fundamentally pursuing my own
pleasure in seeking out or making beautiful things is, I would say, not only
obviously false, but sad: love of things outside myself is not the same as love
of myself, or else it is essentially meaningless.
We ought to
re-connect beauty to the experience not of pleasure, but of love and longing,
which has been traditional since the Greeks. Plato made that connection in the Symposium, and Sappho famously said that
the most beautiful thing is what one loves. But love and longing are ways of
reaching out into the world: ways of devoting oneself to things and people. In love
or longing, one moves toward what one loves or longs for, not into oneself, or
else the love is a delusion. In the words of the Everly Brothers’ beautiful
song, love hurts, and to account for love merely in terms of pleasure is
extremely wrong.
Though pleasure
seems fairly straightforward, human beings have dark and twisted longings, and
much of the art of the twentieth century might even be beautiful in a dark or
twisted way.
Alexander Nehamas
makes some of these points in his book Only
a Promise of Happiness. And Elaine Scarry, in Of Beauty and Being Just, tries to answer the political objections:
the Greeks conceived justice as a harmonious or symmetrical arrangement of elements
or forces, which is also the way Aristotle or the architect of the Parthenon
conceived beauty.
In short, beauty is
being re-enriched as a concept, and insofar as we still long and still love, we
still seek beautiful things. Perhaps beauty is not eternal. But it appears to
have picked itself up from its pratfall, bruised but ready for more.
Crispin Sartwell
teaches at Dickinson College in Carlisle, PA. He is the author of Six Names
of Beauty (Routledge 2006).
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